Private Finance Initiative (PPP)

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 18 July 2011

23.11.2011 / Seventeenth Report of Session 2010–12

Der im Sommer diesen Jahres vom Britischen Parlament veröffentlichte 7. Bericht kommt zu folgenden Ergebnissen:

1) PPP ist teurer als die Eigenfinanzierung öffentlicher Investitionen im Wege der Kreditaufnahme:

"The use of PFI has the effect of increasing the cost of finance for public investments relative to what would be available to the government if it borrowed on its own account. (Paragraph 6)" *

2) PPP wirken wie eine Art Hebel für die öffentliche Verschuldung bei gleichzeitiger Verschleierung des Umfangs dieser Verschuldung. Die Verschuldung verschwindet aus der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung (Verlagerung in die PPP-Konstruktionen):

"The introduction of IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) in 2009-10 has resulted in nearly all PFI debt being included in the financial accounts of government departments for financial reporting purposes. However so long as certain risks are deemed to be passed to the private sector on a PFI project then the project is, by contrast, recorded off balance sheet for National Accounts and statistical purposes. As a result, most PFI debt is invisible to the calculation of Public Sector Net Debt (PSND) and is therefore not included in the headline debt and deficit statistics. If all current PFI liabilities were included in the National Accounts then the OBR estimates that national debt would increase by £35 billion (2.5% of GDP). Therefore there has been, and continues to be, at least a small incentive to use PFI in preference to other procurement options, as it results in lower headline government borrowing and debt figures in comparison to other forms of capital investment. (Paragraph 17)"

3) Die PPP-Modelle werden als ineffizient eingeschätzt. Die Ineffizienz ist in der aktuellen Wirtschaftskrise gestiegen:

"The substantial increase in private finance costs means that the PFI financing method is *now extremely inefficient. Recent data suggests that the Weighted Average Cost of Capital of a PFI is double that of government gilts. PFI will only provide value for money if this differential in the cost of finance, which has significantly increased, is outweighed by savings and efficiencies during the life of a PFI project. (Paragraph 30)"

4) Keine Evidenz dafür, dass PPP´s mit Zeit- und Flexibilitätsvorteilen verbunden sind:

"*However there is no convincing evidence to suggest that PFI projects are delivered more quickly and at a lower out-turn cost than projects using conventional procurement methods. ...We have received little evidence of the benefits of these arrangements, but much evidence about the drawbacks, especially for NHS projects. The inflexibility of PFI means that any emergent problems or new demands on an asset cannot be efficiently resolved. In the case of Transport for London its only option was to buy out the SPV, but most PFI procurers cannot afford to do this. (Paragraph 56)"

Der Bericht befindet sich auf der Parlaments-Webseite unter:

und ist hier im Anhang als PDF archiviert